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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________________ 
 
NOS. 94-7520 and 94-7539 
__________________ 
 
CARLISLE AREA SCHOOL 
 
v. 
 
SCOTT P., BY AND THROUGH HIS GUARDIANS, 
BESS P. AND RICHARD E. P., 
 
          Appellant in No. 94-7520 
 
CARLISLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
          Appellant in No. 94-7539 
 
v. 
 
SCOTT P., BY AND THROUGH HIS GUARDIANS, 
BESS P. AND RICHARD E. P. 
 
_______________________________ 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 93-cv-00458) 
_______________________________ 
 
Argued: March 10, 1995 
 
Before: BECKER, SCIRICA, and WOOD,0  
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  August 8, 1995) 
 
 
   DENNIS C. McANDREWS, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
   315 Upper Gulph Road 
   Wayne, PA  19087 
 
                                                           
0
*.  The Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr., United States Circuit 
Judge for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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   Attorney for Scott P., by and through 
his 
   Guardian, Bess P. and Richard E. P. 
 
    
 
   FRANK P. CLARK, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
   James, Smith & Durkin 
   20 Valley Road 
   P.O. Box 650 
   Hershey, PA  17033 
 
   Attorney for Carlisle Area School 
   District 
 
_______________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1990).  
The underlying administrative proceeding against the Carlisle 
Area School District was commenced by Scott P., a disabled twenty 
year old, through his parents, Richard P. and Bess P. on the 
grounds that the school district had not fulfilled its statutory 
obligations to Scott under IDEA.  The hearing officer at the 
local educational level granted the relief requested, i.e., 
residential placement, and six months' compensatory education (to 
extend beyond Scott's 21st birthday.)  An appeals panel at the 
state education agency level reversed the residential placement 
order but affirmed the award of compensatory education.  The 
school district appealed this decision to the District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and the parents cross-
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appealed.  The district court affirmed the decision of the 
appeals panel.  The parents appeal the denial of residential 
placement.  The school district appeals the award of compensatory 
education. 
 The appeal presents several questions of special 
education law of first impression in this Circuit.  First, we 
must address the parents' contention that the administrative and 
judicial proceedings were procedurally defective because of an 
alleged violation of IDEA's efficiency-oriented finality 
requirements stemming from the district court's two remands to 
the appeals panel for clarification.  Although the parents assail 
the fact that the district court twice remanded the case to the 
appeals panel, we hold that these remands did not violate IDEA's 
finality requirements since they advanced rather than impeded the 
goal of safeguarding access to meaningful judicial review. 
 Second, the appeal requires us to decide the proper 
scope of review to be used by a state appeals panel reviewing a 
local hearing officer's decision, and the proper scope of review 
by the district court in reviewing a ruling of a state appeals 
panel.  We conclude that the appeals panel's review is plenary 
except that it is required to defer to the hearing officer's 
credibility determinations unless non-testimonial, extrinsic 
evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion or 
unless the record read in its entirety would compel a contrary 
conclusion.  The district court may reach an independent 
decision, except that it must accord the decision of the state 
agency "due weight" in its consideration.  In a related vein, we 
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also address the parents' claim that the appeals panel and the 
district court misallocated the burden of proof on the 
appropriateness of the proffered Individualized Educational 
Program ("IEP").  We conclude that, while school districts bear 
the burden of proving the appropriateness of the educational 
plans they proffer, they are not required to prove the 
inappropriateness of any competing plans advocated by parents. 
 Next, we consider whether the appeals panel applied the 
correct standard in reviewing the order for residential 
education. As the district court correctly recognized, IDEA 
requires a placement calculated to confer only some educational 
benefit (not an optimal education), and also that the program be 
delivered in the least restrictive environment.  On the developed 
record, the district court did not err in concluding that 
residential placement was not proper, and thus it correctly 
affirmed the appeals panel's reversal of the residential 
placement order. 
 Finally, we must determine the appropriate standard for 
the award of compensatory education and the correctness of the 
award in this case.  Compensatory education effectively extends 
the disabled student's entitlement to a free appropriate 
education beyond the normal cutoff point, which occurs when the 
child reaches age 21.  We conclude that the award of compensatory 
education was improper here because there was no record evidence 
of any violation during the year purporting to serve as the basis 
for the award, and certainly no gross or prolonged deprivation, 
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which other courts have required as a precondition to a 
compensatory education award. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Scott P., who was born on February 12, 1973, sustained 
serious brain injuries resulting in cortical blindness in a 1980 
swimming pool accident.0  Prior to the accident, Scott attended 
regular kindergarten and first grade, but has been enrolled in 
various special educational programs since that time. 
 During the 1991-92 school year, Scott's parents and the 
school district were unable to agree upon an appropriate 
educational program for the 1992-93 year.  The plan offered by 
the school district would have enrolled Scott in a physical 
support class at the Mechanicsburg High School operated by the 
Capital Area Intermediate Unit ("CAIU").  One other blind student 
and two students suffering from head trauma were also assigned to 
this class.  Scott's parents contested the appropriateness of 
this plan because of its resemblance to the 1991-92 IEP, under 
which they contended Scott had not progressed. 
 The parents thereupon took Scott to the A.I. duPont 
Institute, which conducted an evaluation of Scott's needs.  The 
duPont Institute recommended that Scott be placed in an intensive 
                                                           
0The accident also caused light spastic hemiplegia, irritable 
bowel syndrome, gastroesophageal reflex, von Willebrandt's 
disease, temporomandibular joint dysfunction, status post 
cholecystectomy, status post ventriculoperitoneal shunt, and 
vocal chord weakness.  Additionally, Scott has been susceptible 
to depression, migraine headaches, recurrent sinus and strep 
infections, gastrointestinal problems and hepatitis C.   
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residential program at the Maryland School for the Blind ("MSB") 
so that he could attain greater independence.  In light of this 
recommendation, and given Scott's failure to progress in 
preceding years, Scott's family and his private evaluator 
submitted that he needed (and that the IEP should provide) the 
specialized educational placement for blind students provided at 
MSB.  In September, 1992, Scott's family enrolled him in MSB; 
they also requested the statutorily-provided due process 
proceedings in order to contest the educational program the 
school district had proposed for Scott.  At issue was the 
district's obligation to reimburse Scott's parents for his 
education at MSB. 
 Due process hearings were conducted before a state 
hearing officer, Dr. Joseph French, on December 3, 15, and 17, 
1992.  Based on documentary evidence and the testimony of various 
experts and teachers, Dr. French filed a report and order 
directing the school district to develop an IEP for Scott that 
would provide academic, social, and vocational instruction with 
blind peers.  The order also specified that such instruction 
continue beyond normal school hours.  The effect of this order 
was to require that the school district provide (i.e., pay for) 
residential programming for Scott at the MSB, as neither the 
District nor the CAIU could accommodate such an IEP in their 
existing programs.  Dr. French also ordered that Scott receive 
six months of education beyond his 21st birthday to "compensat[e]  
for the first half of the current [1992-93] school year."  Op. at 
9 (citations omitted).  
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 The school district filed exceptions to Dr. French's 
decision.  On March 3, 1993, a Pennsylvania Special Education 
Appeals Panel, Anne Hartwig presiding, issued a decision which 
acknowledged the inadequacy of the 1992-93 IEP, and ordered more 
instruction with blind peers, but reversed the order of 
residential placement.  Although the panel recited that it had 
given "due deference" to the hearing officer's findings of fact, 
it rejected the finding that Scott required programming beyond 
normal school hours on the grounds that the record evidence taken 
as a whole did not support the conclusion that Scott required a 
residential placement in order to provide programming beyond 
normal school hours.  However, the panel affirmed the award of 
compensatory education.   
 On April 2, 1993, the school district appealed the 
decision of the appeals panel by filing a complaint in the 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania alleging 
that "the panel erroneously ordered changes to Scott P.'s 
Individualized Educational Program that are in conflict with the 
narrative discussion in the panel's decision."  A brief 
evidentiary hearing was conducted on January 24, 1994, at which 
the District Court heard additional evidence concerning Scott's 
program at MSB.  On March 30, 1994, the district court, which 
found the appeals panel decision confusing, ordered that the case 
be "remanded to the Pennsylvania Special Education Appeals Panel 
for clarification . . . ."  
 On April 27, 1994, Hartwig delivered a clarification 
for the appeals panel.  The district court was still dissatisfied 
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with this "clarification," which purported to find the 1992-93 
IEP appropriate even though the panel had ordered modifications 
to the program in its original opinion; moreover, in justifying 
its award of compensatory education, the panel had declared the 
1991-92 IEP inappropriate even though the appropriateness of that 
program had not been challenged and had not served as the basis 
of the hearing officer's award.  The district court therefore 
remanded this case to the appeals panel for another 
clarification.  On July 6, 1994, Hartwig issued a second 
"clarification."  The district court, while commenting that the 
"renderings of the Appeals Panel remain somewhat confusing," 
stated that it was according the appeals panel's decision 
"considerable deference" and affirmed its order. The parents 
appeal the denial of the residential placement; the district 
appeals the award of compensatory education.  
 
II. FINALITY 
 The parents make a claim of procedural defect based on 
regulations under IDEA which require that the hearing officer 
issue a final order within 45 days of the parents' request for a 
hearing and that the appeals panel's decision must be issued 
within 30 days of the request for an appeal.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(e)(1); 34 C.F.R. §300.512.  The parents allege that the 
district court violated their procedural rights under IDEA by 
twice remanding the action to the appeals panel for 
clarification.  We disagree.  
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 In Muth v. Central Bucks School District, 839 F.2d at 
124-26 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 491 U.S. 223, 109 
S. Ct. 2397 (1989), we specifically prohibited the use of remands 
to administrative hearing officers for further proceedings.  
Muth, however, dealt with a remand by the secretary of the state 
agency to the appeals panel, not a remand by a judge.  Moreover, 
Muth rested on the rationale that remands to the administrative 
hearing officer obstructed the party's access to judicial review.  
To prohibit the court from remanding for clarification would 
impair the court's ability to review the decision fairly and 
undermine the very policies animating Muth.  The fact that these 
particular remands did not aid the court in disposing of this 
case does not invalidate the remands.  Thus, while the statute 
clearly proscribes remands within the state's administrative 
system, we see no basis for prohibiting judicial remands.  
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Introduction 
 A good deal of the briefing and argument in this appeal 
has focused on the standard of review.  This attention results 
from the fact that three applicable levels of review are at issue 
-- our review of the district court's order; the district court's 
review of the state appeals panel's decision; and the appeals 
panel's review of the hearing officer's decision.  We, of course, 
exercise plenary review over the district court's conclusions of 
law and review its findings of fact for clear error.  Wexler v. 
Westfield Bd. of Educ., 784 F.2d 176, 181 (3d Cir.), cert. 
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denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 99 (1986).  Because the parents 
here allege that the district court failed to observe its own 
proper scope of review, we must determine whether the district 
court erred in its interpretation or application of the law 
governing the administrative review process, a question over 
which we exercise plenary review.  Louis W. Epstein Family 
Partnership v. KMart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 The parents' burden of proof and finality arguments 
also hinge on legal interpretations, and are thus subject to 
plenary review.  Id.  We review the district court's 
determination of the 1992-93 IEP's appropriateness, a factual 
question, see Association for Community Living v. Romer, 992 F.2d 
1040, 1044 (10th Cir. 1993); Hampton School Dist. v. Dobrowolski, 
976 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1992), under a clearly erroneous 
standard, Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1988), 
while we exercise plenary review over the legal standard relied 
upon to evaluate the IEP and to approve the award of compensatory 
education.  Wexler, 784 F.2d at 181. 
 B. Discussion 
 The parents' threshold argument is that the district 
court erred when, despite the fact that the state appeals panel 
did not properly defer to the findings and recommendations of the 
hearing officer, it affirmed the panel's order.  As we have 
noted, the administrative regime at issue here creates two 
questions pertaining to the appropriate standard of review.  
First, we must determine what degree of deference the appeals 
panel owes the hearing officer.  Second, we must decide the 
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degree of deference owed by a district court reviewing an appeals 
panel's reversal of the hearing officer, and we must determine 
whether the appeals panel deserves less deference when it 
contravenes the hearing officer's factual findings. 
 
1. The Statutory Framework. 
 IDEA requires that states receiving federal funds for 
education must provide every disabled child with a "free 
appropriate public education."  20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1990).  The 
core of this entitlement is provided by the IEP, the package of 
special educational and related services designed to meet the 
unique needs of the disabled child.  See Polk v. Central 
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030, 109 S. Ct. 738 (1989).  
Regulations promulgated under IDEA entitle parents dissatisfied 
with their child's IEP to "an impartial due process hearing."  20 
U.S.C. §1415(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506-512.  States may choose 
either a one-or a two-tier administrative system.  Pennsylvania 
has a two-tier system in which the initial hearing occurs at the 
local educational agency level followed by an "independent" 
review of that hearing at the state educational agency level.  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1990). Federal regulation § 300.510, 
promulgated under § 1415(c), provides that an "impartial" officer 
is to conduct the review and that such officer should make an 
"independent decision."   See 34 C.F.R. §300.510 (1993). 
 A party aggrieved by a final order of the state 
authorities may appeal to federal court.  Section 1415(e) of IDEA 
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provides that district courts "shall receive the records of the 
[state] administrative proceedings,  shall hear additional 
evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on 
the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the 
court determines is appropriate."  20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1990).  
Although this provision could be read to permit the district 
court to review the evidence de novo, disregarding the findings 
and rulings of the state agencies, the Supreme Court has required 
that federal district courts afford "due weight" to state 
administrative proceedings in evaluating claims under IDEA.  See 
Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 
3051 (1982).  As we explained in Oberti v. Board of Education, 
995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993), district courts have 
discretion to determine how much deference to accord the 
administrative proceedings, and although the district courts 
"must consider the administrative findings of fact, [they are] 
free to accept or reject them." Id. at 1219 (quoting Jefferson 
County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 
1988)).  But if the district court chooses to depart from the 
agency's ruling, it should provide some explanation for its 
departure.  See Doyle v. Arlington County School Bd., 953 F.2d 
100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991).  
 The ramifications of Rowley's injunction to give "due 
weight" are unclear where a state creates a two-tiered 
administrative regime and each tier arrives at a different 
conclusion.  The circuits have split on the question whether 
federal district courts acting pursuant to Rowley should accord 
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due weight to the trial level hearing officer or to the appeals 
panel where the two bodies differ and where the appeals panel may 
not have properly deferred to the hearing officer's findings.  In 
Thomas v. Cincinnati Board of Education, the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit held that the "only logical position" was to 
defer to the appeals panel, the final decision-maker of the state 
agency, over the hearing officer.  918 F.2d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 
1990).  See also Karl v. Board of Education of Geneseo County 
School Dist., 736 F.2d 873, 877 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We believe 
Rowley requires that federal courts defer to the final decision 
of the state authorities, and that deference may not be eschewed 
merely because a decision is not unanimous or the reviewing 
authority disagrees with the hearing officer.").  In contrast,  
the Fourth Circuit has held that the district court erred in 
deferring to a reviewing officer who, reversing the hearing 
officer, discredited a witness he had not seen or heard testify.  
See Doyle, 953 F.2d at 100. 
 At the threshold, we must decide whether the appeals 
panel failed to defer to the hearing officer, for if we find that 
the appeals panel adequately deferred to the hearing officer, 
then the district court plainly complied with Rowley in according 
"considerable deference" to the appeals panel's decision.  
Because the provisions of IDEA that accommodate the two-tier due 
process system do not specify the proper standard, see Perry A. 
Zirkel, The Standard of Review Applicable to Pennsylvania's 
Special Education Appeals Panel, 3  WIDENER J. PUBLIC L. 871, 876 
(1994), we must first decide what that standard is. 
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 a. Appeals Panel Review of the Hearing Officer's 
    Decision 
 
 Section  1415(c) describes the state agency's review as 
follows:  "If the [initial impartial] hearing ... is conducted by 
a local educational agency ..., any party aggrieved by the 
findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal to 
the State Education Agency which shall conduct an impartial 
review of such hearing.  The officer conducting such review shall 
make an independent decision upon completion of such review." 20 
U.S.C. §1415(c) (emphasis added).  The regulation interpreting 
this provision further provides that the reviewing officer may 
"[s]eek additional evidence if necessary," and may "[a]fford the 
parties an opportunity for oral or written argument, or both, at 
the discretion of the reviewing official." 34 C.F.R. § 
300.510(b)(3)-(4) (1993) (emphasis added).  Although this 
language does not explicitly define the appeals panel's scope of 
review, it suggests a non-deferential standard.0  The fact that 
the statute contemplates that the appeals body will make an 
"independent decision" suggests not that the appellate body 
should defer but that it should reach a decision based on its own 
                                                           
0We need not address the question whether federal law pre-empts 
state laws which specify the appeals panel's standard of review 
since the Pennsylvania statute creating the apparatus for the 
two-tiered due process hearing is silent on this issue.  The 
Pennsylvania statute provides:  "The decision of the impartial 
hearing officer may be appealed to a panel of three appellate 
hearing officers.  The panel's decision may be appealed further 
to a court of competent jurisdiction.  In notifying the parties 
of its decision, the panel shall indicate the courts to which an 
appeal may be taken."  22 PA. CODE § 1464(m) (1992).  The 
Pennsylvania courts have not consistently interpreted this 
statute to impose a definitive standard of review.  See Zirkel, 3 
WIDENER J. PUBLIC L. at 878-82.   
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evaluation of the evidence, "independent" of the findings of the 
hearing officer. The language of the regulation, see 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.510(b)(3) (1993), bolsters this interpretation, since the 
receipt of additional evidence necessarily entails the weighing 
of the new evidence against the evidence presented in the first 
(administrative) hearing.   
 As a matter of general appellate principle, however, 
appeals panels ordinarily defer to the trial presider's factual 
findings based on credibility judgments about the witnesses 
presented at the trial or hearing.  For example, Rule 52(a) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:  "Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).  See also Anderson v. 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (1985) 
(requiring even greater deference to the trial court's findings 
regarding the credibility of witnesses than to the court's other 
fact findings).0 But deference to a factfinder's particular 
credibility judgment does not necessarily result in deference to 
all of the findings of fact based on that judgment. 
 While review of credibility-based factual findings is 
limited, it is not meaningless.  "Where . . . the findings . . . 
                                                           
0Obviously, conclusions of law receive plenary review.  See, 
e.g., Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. KMart Corp., 13 F.3d 
762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying plenary review to choice, 
interpretation and application of the law to the historical 
facts).  Moreover, a trial court cannot shield a legal error from 
review simply by labelling it as a factual finding.  Id. 
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are not supported by the record, and indeed, the record supports 
contrary findings, we must reverse."  Ali v. Gibson, 631 F.2d 
1126, 1129 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981); 
see also Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. at 1512 
(restricting deference to cases where credibility evidence is not 
contradicted by "extrinsic evidence"); Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 
125, 126 (3d Cir. 1988) (limiting appellate review to an 
assessment of whether there is enough evidence on the record to 
support such credibility findings).   
 We thus embrace the Fourth Circuit's approach in Doyle 
v. Arlington County School Board, 953 F.2d at 105, to the extent 
that that decision was premised on this specific principle, that 
credibility-based findings deserve deference unless non-
testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a 
contrary conclusion or unless the record read in its entirety 
would compel a contrary conclusion.  But beyond this rather 
narrow class of record-supported, credibility-based factual 
findings, we think that, to give the statute's language about 
"independent" decisions effect, the appeals panel must have much 
more leeway in reviewing other non-credibility based findings of 
the hearing officer.  See Zirkel, 3 WIDENER J. PUBLIC L. at 892.  We 
will therefore defer to the appeals panel rather than the hearing 
officer in most circumstances, bringing us closer to the approach 
taken by the Second and Sixth Circuits in Karl v. Board of 
Education of Geneseo and Thomas v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 
respectively.  See supra at p. 11-12. 
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 Our approach is also consistent with administrative law 
principles, which permit an agency or board freely to accept or 
reject an ALJ's findings and conclusions of law.  Section 557(b) 
of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides:  "On appeal 
from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the 
powers which it would have in making the initial decision except 
as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."  5 U.S.C. 
§ 557(b) (1995). Courts review the board's decisions, not those 
of the ALJ's. Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246, 1252 
(4th Cir. 1986) (citing 3 K. Davis Administrative Law Treatise, § 
17.16 (2d ed. 1980)).   
 Moreover, limiting the appeals panel's deference to 
those situations involving record-supported credibility 
determinations tracks the approach taken by other administrative 
regimes, such as that created by the National Labor Relations 
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1973 and Supp. 1995); see Stein 
Seal Co. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the 
Board was free to make fact findings contrary to the ALJ's so 
long as they are supported by substantial evidence); Local 259, 
United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers v. NLRB, 776 
F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding the decision of the Board where 
differences between ALJ and the board did not result from 
divergence of views as to credibility of testimony concerning 
evidentiary facts but instead resulted from differences in 
overall judgment as to proper inferences and ultimate 
determination).   
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 We thus hold that appeals panels reviewing the fact 
findings of hearing officers in two-tier schemes (such as 
Pennsylvania's) exercise plenary review, except that they should 
defer to the hearing officer's findings based on credibility 
judgments unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the 
record would justify a contrary conclusion or unless the record 
read in its entirety would compel a contrary conclusion. 
 b.  District Court Review of the Appeals Panel 
 As we noted, see supra at 11, IDEA empowers the 
district court to hear additional evidence, and directs the court 
to base its decision on the preponderance of the evidence.  We 
have interpreted Rowley's mandate to accord "due weight" to the 
administrative proceedings as a requirement to consider -- 
although not necessarily to accept -- the administrative fact 
findings. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219.  The precise question here is 
whether the district court owes less consideration to the 
administrative fact findings when the second tier reversed the 
first tier.  Clearly, the district court's review should be 
unaffected where the appeals panel owes no deference to the 
hearing officer.  Thus, the issue is whether the district court's 
review should be any less deferential where the appeals panel 
disregarded a record-supported, credibility-based factual 
determination of the hearing officer. 
 Given our decision about the appeals panel's scope of 
review, we conclude that a district court should still give "due 
weight" to the appeals panel's decision when it reverses the 
hearing officer's conclusions of law, inferences from proven 
19 
facts, and factual findings based on credibility judgments where 
non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence justified the appeals panel's 
contrary decision.0  In this case, because the appeals panel 
                                                           
0We assume without deciding that, under IDEA, a district court 
should accord somewhat less consideration to an appeals panel 
ruling that disregards a hearing officer's credibility judgments 
where this standard is not met.  We base this assumption on the 
standards applicable in other statutory regimes that also involve 
a two-level administrative proceeding.  See Chen v. General 
Accounting  Office, 821 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring 
administrative board to accord great deference to those findings 
of original decision maker that turned on credibility judgments); 
Brock v. L.E. Myers Co., High Voltage Div., 818 F.2d 1270 (6th 
Cir. 1987) (requiring Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission to articulate reasons for failing to credit findings 
of an ALJ who had a unique opportunity to observe demeanor of 
witnesses); Citizens St. Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 718 
F.2d 1440 (8th Cir. 1983) (scrutinizing agency's decision where 
agency departed from ALJ's finding without reflecting attentive 
consideration to ALJ's decision); Haberson v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 977 
(10th Cir. 1987) (requiring NLRB to accord ALJ findings due 
weight although board is not bound by ALJ findings).  Cf. Stein 
Seal Co. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1979) (regarding the 
ALJ's findings as "merely advisory" where the Board's contrary 
findings are supported by substantial evidence).  But see 
Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(allowing Merit Systems Protection Board to accept or reject 
ALJ's findings and conclusions of law).  The National Labor 
Relations Act caselaw specifically addressing the issue of 
judicial review of administrative appeals also suggests that, al-
though district courts should normally defer to the Board's deci-
sions, the courts should be less deferential where the Board 
reached a decision contrary to the ALJ's.  See GSX Corp. of 
Missouri v. NLRB, 918 F.2d 1351 (8th Cir. 1990) (reviewing 
board's findings more critically where board's findings are 
contrary to ALJ's); C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 921 F.2d 350 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying "slightly" less 
deferential standard to the board where it reaches a conclusion 
opposite to the ALJ); Centre Property Management v. NLRB, 807 
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying "more searching" scrutiny to 
board's findings where they conflict with ALJ's); NLRB v. Cooper 
Union for Advancement of Science and Art, 783 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 
1986) (applying higher scrutiny to board findings that differ 
from ALJ's but only where differences concern evidence that turns 
on credibility).  But see Glaziers Local Union 558 v. NLRB, 787 
F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying the same standard to the 
board whether or not it reached conclusions contrary to the ALJ).  
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found that the extrinsic evidence in the record supported 
conclusions contrary to those of the hearing officer, the 
district court correctly gave the panel's decision "due weight" 
notwithstanding the panel's differences with the hearing officer. 
2. The Nature of the Disputed Rulings. 
 We turn to the nature of the disputed rulings, for 
application of the standard of review turns thereon.  While this 
discussion will propel us to some degree into a discussion of the 
merits, treated infra, that cannot be avoided.  Although Scott's 
parents understandably want this court to view the contested 
portions of the hearing officer's ruling as record-supported 
credibility judgments that would be shielded from appeals panel 
review, they are in reality credibility findings that are 
contradicted by not insubstantial record evidence.  With respect 
to the appeals panel's finding that the 1992-93 IEP was 
appropriate, the parents claim that the appeals panel 
"effectively overturned the critical finding by the Hearing 
Officer that 'for the last few years [Scott's] academic 
achievement, as determined by his teacher, has been (only) 
maintained and when measured by standardized tests has continued 
to be at the fourth to fifth grade level.'"  The record, however, 
contained ample evidence that Scott had made progress.  When 
measured by teacher-constructed exams, Scott's academic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Because the disputed portions of the hearing officer's opinion 
did not find support in the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence 
in the record, however, they were not entitled to deference by 
the appeals panel, and we need not decide this issue. 
21 
achievement had improved. HO Op. at 4.  The record also notes 
that Scott had made progress in reading and writing braille. Id.  
 In any event, appropriateness is judged prospectively 
so that any lack of progress under a particular IEP, assuming 
arguendo that there was no progress, does not render that IEP 
inappropriate. See infra at 30-32.  However, even if the 
observation about progress under the 1991-92 IEP did reflect on 
the legal appropriateness of the 1992-93 IEP, it could not, 
standing alone, support the hearing officer's conclusions about 
the 1992-93 IEP: additional inferences and conclusions would have 
to be drawn.  For example, one would have to assume that Scott's 
needs had remained completely unchanged between the years, and 
that one could attribute Scott's lack of progress during 1992-93, 
for example, to the failure of the 1992-93 program to provide a 
service for a need that had manifested itself during the 1991-92 
year (prior to the development of the relevant IEP).   
 Consequently, the appeals panel would not have needed 
to set aside Dr. French's "findings" about the credibility of the 
teacher and the mobility specialist who testified that they had 
seen no progress in recent years to find that the 1992-93 IEP was 
appropriate.  Rather, the appeals panel could have credited their 
statements and nevertheless found that the 1992-93 plan passed 
muster because of the additions to the 1992-93 program0 or 
                                                           
0The plaintiffs' argument that the compensatory education award 
mandates residential placement depends on the identity of the 
1991-92 IEP with the 1992-93 IEP, but there are some important 
differences.  The 1992-93 plan provides for psychological 
counseling with blind youths, OT/PT monitoring, and transition 
planning, three "related services" not supplied in the earlier 
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because of changes in Scott's needs.  Alternatively, the appeals 
panel could have concluded that the non-testimonial, extrinsic 
evidence in the record evidence did not support the findings. 
 While either of these approaches could independently 
justify the appeals panel in making a finding different from the 
hearing officer, the appeals panel invoked both bases in this 
case. The panel carefully distinguished the content of the 1992-
93 IEP from that of the 1991-92 IEP (see 4/27/94 Order at 2), 
thus breaking the link between progress made under prior IEPs and 
the appropriateness of the 1992-93 IEP.  The panel also evidenced 
its searching review of all the record evidence when it stated 
that "there was sufficient evidence in the record so as to allow 
the officer to find that the District had attempted to provide 
Scott with an [appropriate] IEP . . . ." (4/27/94 Order at 2.) 
 At all events, the core issue in this case pertains to 
the state appeals panel's reversal of the hearing officer's award 
of residential education at the MSB.  The parents contend that 
the appeals panel "simply rejected Dr. French's critical factual 
findings that 'in addition to regular therapy, Scott needs help 
from peers with similar problems . . . .  He needs programming 
beyond typical school hours to have sufficient intensity to make 
additional gains.'"  But here too, the appeals panel did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
plan.  The 1992-93 IEP also contains a much more detailed set of 
goals/predictions in the "Content" section, and a much more 
specific list of "Specially Designed Instruction."  Additionally, 
the later program reflected more ambitious "Expected Post-School 
Outcomes," listing, for example, supported employment or 
sheltered employment where the earlier plan had only stated "will 
explore more specific evaluations."  Compare generally, 1992-93 
IEP, 582-596a, with 1991-92 IEP, 702a-710a. 
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simply reject the testimony relied on by the hearing officer so 
much as find that the record did not support the officer's 
conclusion.  In particular, the hearing officer relied on 
testimony that Scott needed his school instruction to be 
reinforced by other activities to find that these reinforcing 
activities needed to occur "during other hours of his day," a 
phrase he took to require residential placement.  The appeals 
panel believed, however, "that there was insufficient evidence in 
the record" to support the conclusion that those reinforcing 
activities had to occur "during other hours of his day."  4/27/94 
Order at 3.   
 The appeals panel's rejection of the residential 
placement also resulted from its doubts about the attribution of 
Scott's failure to accept his blindness (and its effects on his 
progress) to the deficiency of peer contact afforded by the 
school district's IEP.  See 3/3/93 Order at 4 n.13 ("The record 
seems to indicate that this inability or unwillingness by Scott 
to accept his handicap may account for his apparent lack of 
progress as anticipated by his teachers and parents.  The issue, 
however, is whether more contact with blind peers is the remedy 
or whether increased skills will help Scott accept his 
handicap.")  
 Had the appeals panel found that Scott did not need any 
peer contact and/or that he did not require any additional 
programming, the appeals panel would have been rejecting well-
supported testimony credited by the hearing officer.  But the 
record evidence did not unequivocally support the hearing 
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officer's findings with respect to progress under prior IEP's, 
off-hour programming, or the need for more peer contact.  Because 
the record evidence did not support the findings, this is simply 
not a case where the panel encroached on the credibility 
judgments of the hearing officer, for we agree with the appeals 
panel that "the reasons why Scott has not made the anticipated 
progress in his educational placement remain unclear."  More 
specifically, it appears that Scott was not attending school for 
the full day and missed certain extended periods due to various 
illnesses.   
 Both the appeals panel and the hearing officer felt 
that full implementation of the school district's IEP was impeded 
by those factors.  See 3/27/94 Order at 2 ("The panel agreed with 
the Hearing Officer that a significant difficulty in evaluating 
the appropriateness of the proposed '92 IEP was Scott's failure 
to attend his school program for a full day.  The officer 
speculated, if Scott did not go home at 1 p.m., he could have 
training in daily living skills provided at the school."); HO Op. 
at 4.  As a consequence, the testimony that Scott needed more 
programming, even if credited, does not compel residential 
placement, especially in light of the 1992-93 IEP's proposal to 
provide "full day" programming.   
 Neither does Scott's need for peer contact necessarily 
require residential placement, since the appeals panel found that 
there was sufficient evidence in the record 
so as to allow the officer to find that the 
District had attempted to provide Scott with 
an IEP that would permit him an opportunity 
to interact with peers.  While the 
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opportunity to interact, as provided by the 
District, may not be [sic] have been ideal or 
optimal, nevertheless, the panel concluded 
that the District had acted in a manner that 
would have allowed Scott to reasonably 
benefit from his placement, in this context 
of interaction with peers.  
4/27/94 Order at 2-3.  Aside from the fact that evidence 
supporting the need for more peer contact was contradicted, to 
give such testimony dispositive effect would run afoul of at 
least two legal propositions under IDEA (discussed below):  that 
the district need not provide the optimal IEP, and that the 
program be provided in the least restrictive educational environ-
ment appropriate to the needs of the child.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(5)(B) (1990).   
 The panel correctly stated the law when it wrote:  "The 
Hearing Officer's conclusion that Scott must then be entitled to 
a residential placement is incorrect.  The standard to be applied 
in determining the least restrictive alternative is not to find 
an optimum placement for Scott but rather to decide whether an 
appropriate educational placement can be achieved in a non-
restrictive setting."  See 3/3/93 Op. at 5.  Under the 
appropriate legal framework, therefore, even uncontroverted 
testimony that many more hours of programming or that contact 
with many peers would benefit Scott would not support the 
adoption of a more restrictive residential placement.  Moreover, 
even if the appeals panel had reversed findings based on 
uncontradicted testimony, it would not necessarily change the 
result in this case.  In light of Oberti, 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 
1993), after considering the administrative findings of fact, the 
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district court was free to reach a different conclusion from its 
independent review of the record.   
 Thus, the district court could effectively affirm the 
panel by independently finding its own facts contrary to those 
found by the hearing officer.  Because we are confident that the 
district court did independently consider the record, we believe 
that it could affirm the appeals panel decision even if the 
appeals panel had acted improperly in reversing the hearing 
officer's findings.0  The same arguments refute the parents' 
contention that the district court erred when it affirmed an 
appeals panel ruling it conceded to be "somewhat confusing."  The 
district court could effectively affirm the panel, despite its 
inability to precisely discern the panel's ratio decidendi, by 
making rulings based on its independent review of the record and 
the preponderance of evidence. 
3.  Conclusion 
 Because the contested "findings" of Dr. French (i.e., 
those over which the appeals panel and Dr. French disagree) do 
not find unmixed record support, we conclude that the district 
court correctly accorded the appeals panel "substantial 
consideration," notwithstanding the fact that the panel did not 
adopt the hearing officer's credibility-based recommendations.  
Moreover, to the extent that the hearing officer's 
recommendations offended other provisions of IDEA, they rested on 
                                                           
0Although the district court did accord the decision of the 
Appeals Panel "considerable deference," its opinion also evidenc-
es an independent review of the record.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at 7, 
11. 
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an error of law over which the appeals panel exercised plenary 
review.  Thus, we need not address the question whether the 
"consideration" the district court afforded the appeals panel 
would have been appropriate if the panel had in fact encroached 
on the limited terrain of credibility judgments falling within 
the primary purview of the hearing officer.   
 
IV. BURDEN OF PROOF 
 The parents make an interesting argument that the 
appeals panel erroneously placed the burden of proving the 
inappropriateness of the 1992-93 IEP on them.  Although they fail 
to identify any specific element(s) of the IEP on which the 
school district failed to demonstrate appropriateness, the 
parents rely on the panel's reversal of the order of residential 
placement as proof that the burden had been improperly shifted.  
Contending that the MSB provided better-- and to them the only 
adequate--opportunities for contact with blind peers and for 
expanded programming, they reason that it is also the district's 
burden to prove the inappropriateness of any other IEP they might 
advocate.  We disagree. 
 In administrative and judicial proceedings, the school 
district bears the burden of proving the appropriateness of the 
IEP it has proposed.  Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; Fuhrmann v. East 
Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he 
burden of showing that the placement is 'appropriate' rests with 
the school district.").  But that does not mean that the school 
district also bears the burden of proving the inappropriateness 
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of any alternative IEP that a student's parents might suggest.  
Such a requirement would not only impose a very substantial 
burden on the district, but it would also conflict with Rowley 
and its progeny to the extent that such a general rule would 
effectively necessitate proof that a district's IEPs were the 
best rather than simply proof that they conferred some education-
al benefit. 
 IDEA's requirement that the placement involve the least 
restrictive educational environment, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B), 
further erodes the parent's arguments about the burden of proof. 
In Oberti, the school district bore the burden of proving 
appropriateness when it advocated a more restrictive placement, 
and its teachings are instructive on the question whether it is 
the proponent or the school district who bears the burden of 
proving the necessity for a more restrictive placement.  In 
Oberti, we recognized "a strong presumption in favor of 
mainstreaming", 995 F.2d at 1214, and explained that this 
presumption "would be turned on its head if parents had to prove 
that their child was worthy of being included, rather than the 
school district having to justify a decision to exclude the child 
from the regular classroom."  Id. at 1219.   
 These principles are comparably valid here where the 
parents seek a more restrictive environment.  It simply cannot 
be, in light of the clear congressional preference for inclusion, 
id. at 1214, that the district bears the burden of proving the 
superiority (not mere appropriateness) of the district's 
proffered less restrictive setting.  We therefore will not 
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require the district to prove the inappropriateness of the more 
restrictive MSB placement.  
V. RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 
 The parents argue that the court erred by finding that 
the 1992-93 IEP was appropriate when that plan so closely 
resembled the 1991-92 IEP which, they assert, the court 
implicitly impugned by affirming the appeals panel's award of 
compensatory education. In addition, the parents contend that the 
fact that the appeals panel ordered modifications to the 1992-93 
IEP (in its first 3/3/92 order) must mean that the panel regarded 
the 1992-93 IEP to be inappropriate.  Specifically at issue is 
the appeals panel's reversal of that portion of the hearing 
officer's order, premised on the alleged inappropriateness of the 
1992-93 plan, which effectively required residential education at 
MSB.   
   The principal question, however, even assuming the 
1992-93 IEP was somehow inappropriate, is whether an award of 
residential education was the proper response.  The statutory 
framework imposes dual requirements on school districts.  On the 
one hand, IDEA requires only that school districts provide an 
"appropriate" IEP, gauged by whether the IEP is "sufficient to 
confer some educational benefit."  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200, 102 
S. Ct. at 3048.  Districts need not provide the optimal level of 
services, or even a level that would confer additional benefits, 
since the IEP required by IDEA represents only a "basic floor of 
opportunity."  Id. at 201, 102 S. Ct. at 3048.  See also Fuhrmann 
v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1037, 1040 (3d Cir. 
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1993); Kerkam v. Superintendent D.C. Public Schools, 931 F.2d 84, 
88 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (refusing to test appropriateness by 
comparing disputed IEP with proffered alternatives).  Moreover, 
IDEA also commands the school district officials to construct a 
program in the least restrictive educational environment 
appropriate to the needs of the child.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(5)(B) (1990). Residential placement is, by its nature, 
considerably more restrictive than local extended day 
programming.  See Kerkam, 931 F.2d at 87; G.D. v. Westmoreland 
School Dist., 930 F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir. 1991); Roland M. v. 
Concord School Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 992-93 (1st Cir. 1990).   
   In our view, the district court did not err in 
concluding that the 1992-93 IEP was appropriate in the legally 
relevant sense because that program was calculated to confer some 
educational benefit on Scott.  Although the parents' brief is not 
entirely clear on this point, its attack on the appropriateness 
of the 1992-93 IEP appears principally to rely on that plan's 
alleged similarity to the 1991-92 IEP, rather than make a more 
direct challenge to appropriateness by identifying particular 
needs not addressed by the 1992-93 program.  This reliance is 
misplaced, for the alleged similarity of the 1991-92 and the 
1992-93 IEP's does not mandate the conclusion that a decision 
ordering compensatory education is somehow irreconcilable with 
the refusal to order residential placement.  As we explained in 
Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Board of Education, 993 F.2d 1031, 1040 
(3d Cir. 1993), "the measure and adequacy of an IEP can only be 
determined as of the time it is offered to the student, and not 
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at some later date. . . . Neither the statute nor reason 
countenance 'Monday Morning Quarterbacking' in evaluating the 
appropriateness of a child's placement."  See also Roland M. v. 
Concord School Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1992).  
Consequently, Scott's failure to make progress in the 1991-92 
IEP, a judgment made retrospectively, does not render either the 
1991-92 IEP or the 1992-93 IEP inappropriate. Of course, if a 
student had failed to make any progress under an IEP in one year, 
we would be hard pressed to understand how the subsequent year's 
IEP, if simply a copy of that which failed to produce any gains 
in a prior year, could be appropriate. 
 Moreover, the parents gloss over the many assumptions 
needed to equate the 1991-92 IEP that the appeals panel had found 
inappropriate with the status of the 1992-93 IEP.  In particular, 
the parents believe that the two IEP's are virtually identical 
although they themselves concede that the 1992-93 IEP included 
additional goals and objectives and an arrangement for 
psychological counseling. (appellant's brief at 10).  See also 
supra note 5.  The parents apparently assume that these are 
merely formal additions, but that is not so.  An IEP is a written 
document containing a statement of current educational status, 
annual goals, short term objectives, a description of the type of 
program and reasons for its selection, projected dates for 
initiation and duration, and some objective criteria by which 
instructional objectives can be evaluated.  34 C.F.R. § 300.346 
(1993).  The differences between the 1992-93 IEP and the 1991-92 
IEP are not merely formal; they reflect the very essence of an 
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IEP.  As we have explained, the statute requires that school 
districts prepare the IEP's based on the student's needs; so long 
as the IEP responds to the needs, its ultimate success or failure 
cannot retroactively render it inappropriate. 
 Importantly, the objectives and services added to the 
1992-93 IEP address some of the bases the parents have used to 
argue for the residential placement.  For instance, the district 
proposed group counseling for blind youths, responding to Scott's 
need for more contact with blind peers.  The plan also responded 
to the need for extended hour services by providing orientation 
and mobility training to Scott and his family in their home, 
presumably during non-school hours. (Appellee's brief, n.3).  And 
despite the parents' insistence that only the MSB can adequately 
educate Scott, the district's IEP addresses each of the program 
needs identified by the MSB diagnostic team. (Appellee's brief at 
24-27).  Based on this similarity to the MSB plan, the one 
endorsed by the parents, a correct application of the prospective 
appropriateness inquiry supports the district court's conclusion 
that the 1992-93 program was appropriate. 
 The parents, however, contend that only the residential 
placement recommended by their experts could provide Scott with 
the requisite "intensity" of services needed for him to make any 
progress.  We think this argument turns on the alleged 
superiority of the MSB program rather than the inappropriateness 
of the district's 1992-93 IEP.  We do not denigrate the quality 
of the program available at the MSB and acknowledge that Scott 
might have benefited more from being in it.  Nor can we doubt the 
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parents' best intentions in attempting to seek the optimal 
placement for their son.  But we must agree with the district 
court and the appeals panel in holding that program optimality is 
not the standard.  See 3/3/92 Order at 4; Dist. Ct. Op. at 7.  
Rowley and Furhmann clearly hold that a program is appropriate if 
it confers some educational benefit; it does not need to be 
superior to the alternatives.  See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200, 102 
S. Ct. at 3048; Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1037.  Even assuming that 
"intensity" was required to confer some benefit, the district's 
IEP still satisfies Rowley's appropriateness test.  While the 
district concededly did not propose full day programming for 
Scott, it did offer programming that could have been more 
"intense" than what Scott had actually been experiencing.  Due to 
illnesses and an evaluation at another facility, however, Scott 
apparently missed a substantial number of days during the 1991-92 
school year, and his fatigue apparently caused his parents to 
insist that Scott end his school day at 1 pm, a full hour and a 
half early. 
 In sum, even if it was not optimal, the 1992-93 IEP was 
calculated to confer educational benefit.  IDEA does not require 
more.  In fact, on this record, the district court would have 
erred if it had ordered the allegedly "better" residential 
placement since such an order would have violated other 
provisions of IDEA for, as we have explained, an IEP must not 
only be designed to confer some educational benefit, but it also 
must deliver the programming in the least restrictive educational 
environment.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1990).  Even if the 
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1992-93 IEP was not as responsive to the expert's recommendations 
as the parents might like, the court's authority to order the 
residential education (which may indeed provide Scott with 
"better" services) is limited by this command. 
 Residential placement at MSB is not, of course, the 
least restrictive educational environment.  The least restrictive 
environment is the one that, to the greatest extent possible, 
satisfactorily educates disabled children together with children 
who are not disabled, in the same school the disabled child would 
attend if the child were not disabled.  See 20 U.S.C. § 
1412(5)(B) (requiring maximal educational integration of disabled 
children with children who are not disabled, and restricting 
separate schooling to situations when the nature or severity of 
the disability is such that education in regular classes with the 
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily); 34 C.F.R. § 300.552; see also Oberti, 995 F.2d 
at 1214-16; Cordero v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 795 F.Supp. 
1352 (M.D. Pa. 1992). 
 One of the expressed justifications for the MSB 
placement was to maximize Scott's contact with disabled peers.  
This approach, while conferring benefits in some spheres, 
necessarily minimizes Scott's contact with children without 
disabilities, and thus directly conflicts with the statute's 
objective of inclusion. In a similar factual scenario, the D.C. 
Circuit reversed a district court's order of residential 
education for a child who also could have benefitted from "an 
integrated opportunity for daily living skill reinforcement, 
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recreation, and peer interaction after the six-hour school day."  
Kerkam v. Superintendent D.C. Public Schools, 931 F.2d at 86. In 
Kerkam, the court explained:  
The decision [to order residential education 
over day placement at a district school] 
turned on [the court's] understandable 
concern for Alexander's best interests rather 
than on the appropriateness of the 
educational program . . . .  There seems to 
be little doubt that Alexander would have 
made less progress under the [district's] 
program, but Rowley precludes our taking that 
factor into account so long as the public 
school alternative confers some educational 
benefit. 
 
Id. at 87 (citation omitted). 
 This case presents the same situation.  Placement at 
the MSB was not required under Rowley, and it conflicts with the 
statute.  Accordingly, because the order of the district court 
affirming the Appeals Panel gave "due weight" to its rulings as 
we have explained that concept and because it otherwise properly 
comports with both the appropriateness and the least restrictive 
environment requirements, it must be affirmed.0 
 
                                                           
0We do not reach this result without misgivings.  We are acutely 
sensitive to the factors that so strongly motivated the hearing 
officer and so seriously trouble Scott's parents, namely the need 
for Scott to associate with similarly handicapped peers who are 
succeeding and who might therefore serve as role models and give 
him confidence that he too can succeed.  We acknowledge the 
importance of this approach (and this goal).  A placement at the 
MSB would apparently satisfy this need but would be attended by 
certain disadvantages, such as the lack of contact with non-
handicapped peers, which IDEA elevates to legal relevance.  We 
therefore emphasize the need for public school officials to 
devise means to reconcile these conflicting but compelling 
interests.  
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VI.  COMPENSATORY EDUCATION 
 On cross-appeal, the school district contests the 
hearing officer's award of six months of compensatory education 
to remedy its alleged failure to provide Scott with an 
appropriate program during the 1991-92 year.  Both the panel and 
the district court affirmed this award.  For several 
independently sufficient reasons, we reverse the order of 
compensatory education.0 
 IDEA requires school districts to provide disabled 
children with free, appropriate education until they reach the 
age of twenty-one.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1990).  An award 
of compensatory education extends the disabled student's 
entitlement to the free appropriate education beyond age twenty-
one to compensate for deprivations of that right before the 
student turned twenty-one.  In Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 
865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S. Ct. 
1317 (1991), we recognized that adults (i.e., individuals over 
twenty-one) have a remedy for deprivations of their right to a 
                                                           
0At the threshold, we note that this argument may have been 
waived.  The parents apparently did not contest the appropriate-
ness of the 1991-92 IEP at the time it was offered.  Indeed, they 
seemed to invoke the alleged inappropriateness of the 1991-92 IEP 
only to help them prove that the 1992-93 IEP, which they argued 
was nearly identical, was inappropriate.  Because appropriateness 
is judged prospectively, see Furhmann, 993 F.2d at 1040, and 
discussion supra at 30-32, we have declined the parents' 
invitation to play "Monday morning quarterback" by judging the 
1991-92 IEP in hindsight.  Although we do not construe the 
parents' failure to press their objections to the IEP when it was 
offered as a waiver, it casts significant doubt on their 
contention that the IEP was legally inappropriate since it 
suggests that the parents were also unaware prospectively that 
the 1991-92 IEP was unlikely to confer educational benefit. 
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free appropriate education during the period before they reached 
age twenty-one.  We held that Congress intended compensatory 
education to be available to remedy the deprivation of the right 
to a free appropriate education.  Id. at 872-73 (citing Miener v. 
State of Missouri, 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986)); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415 (authorizing courts to award relief they deem 
appropriate).  Because the Supreme Court has held that tuition 
reimbursement is an appropriate remedy under the EHA (IDEA's 
predecessor), School Committee of Burlington v. Department of 
Education, 471 U.S. 359, 370-71, 105 S. Ct. 1996, 2003 (1985), 
and because a student's access to a remedy should not depend on 
the parents' ability to "front" the costs of the education and 
sue for reimbursement, see Miener, 800 F.2d at 753, courts can, 
under appropriate circumstances, order districts to provide free 
appropriate education after the student reaches twenty-one. 
 We have held that compensatory education is available 
to respond to situations where a school district flagrantly fails 
to comply with the requirements of IDEA.  See Lester H., 916 F.2d 
865. See also Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 
801 (1st Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S. Ct. 2003 (1985) 
(upholding reimbursement as equitable remedy available where 
rights are violated).  Although we do not believe that bad faith 
is required, most of the cases awarding compensatory education 
involved quite egregious circumstances.  This case does not 
appear to be in that category.  For instance, in Lester H., we 
awarded compensatory education where a district took 30 months 
after admitting that the in-district placement was inappropriate 
38 
to locate an appropriate placement despite the availability of at 
least six suitable schools within the state.  See Lester H., 916 
F.2d at 870, 873.  In addition to implicating much more culpable 
conduct, Lester H. also explicitly reserved the question whether 
a court could order compensatory education for periods when a 
district attempts in good faith to develop an appropriate 
placement.  Lester H., 916 F.2d at 873 n.12. 
 The cases from other circuits which recognize 
compensatory education without explicitly requiring a higher 
degree of intent by the district have also involved more culpable 
conduct. See Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071, 1073 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(awarding compensatory education where state institution 
disqualified a student because of its purported inability to 
accommodate his multiple handicaps without mentioning or 
considering placement in an extant special program for multiple 
handicapped students); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 
853 F.2d 854, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (awarding compensatory 
education to deter states from unnecessarily prolonging 
litigation); Miener v. State of Mo., 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(reversing denial of compensatory education for a child who spent 
three years in mental health ward of a state hospital after 
district failed to provide any educational services 
notwithstanding its own evaluation recommending such services).  
At least one other circuit has explicitly made a "gross" 
violation of IDEA a prerequisite to an award of compensatory 
education.  See Garro v. State of Conn., 23 F.3d 734 (2d Cir. 
1994); Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990) 
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(requiring a gross violation and defining such as instances of 
undue delay in holding hearings or taking advantage of mental 
infirmity to deny a placement).   
 We find the Second Circuit's approach generally 
persuasive.  Although generally speaking we believe that a 
plaintiff seeking compensatory education must prove a gross or 
prolonged deprivation of the right to a free appropriate 
education, the facts of this case patently do not approach this 
situation, and we therefore need not precisely define the 
standard.  Two things are clear, however.  First, it is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to demonstrate that some IEP was 
actually inappropriate.  Second, bad faith is not required. 
 In this case, there can be no award of compensatory 
education because the record does not contain any evidence 
pertaining to the inappropriateness of the 1991-92 IEP, the 
program serving as the basis for the award.  The only evidence 
bears on Scott's lack of progress.  But as we have explained, 
appropriateness involves only a prospective evaluation of the 
IEP, not an after-the-fact measurement of the student's success 
under the plan.  
 Even if there were some record on the appropriateness 
of the 1991-92 IEP, the compensatory education award would still 
be erroneous since there is simply no indication of any gross or 
prolonged deprivation by the district.  The district's ignorance 
of the parent's dissatisfaction with the 1991-92 IEP (due to 
their failure to contest that program) precludes a finding that 
40 
any deprivation was flagrantly prolonged.0  Since the record does 
not reflect the district's awareness of the inappropriateness of 
the 1991-92 IEP, this case is unlike Lester H.  And once the 
district was apprised of the arguable inappropriateness of the 
1992-93 plan, it did not delay in seeking to resolve the dispute.  
Thus, under the circumstances of this case, it simply cannot be 
said that the district deprived Scott of an appropriate 
placement, delayed for any inordinate period of time in 
addressing any disputes over the program, or in any other way 
grossly disregarded its obligation to provide Scott with an 
appropriate educational program. 
 In any event, there was no violation shown here, since 
the 1991-92 IEP was not challenged and was therefore 
presumptively appropriate.  We must therefore reverse the 
district court's order insofar as it awarded six months of 
compensatory education for the purported inappropriateness of the 
1991-92 IEP. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the district court insofar as it upheld the denial of the 
                                                           
0Although the fact that the appropriateness of the 1991-92 IEP 
was not properly challenged renders any further analysis of the 
school district's culpability unnecessary, we note that the 
district court appeared to misapprehend the standard.  The 
district court seemed satisfied that the parents' challenge to 
the 1992-93 IEP made the school district aware of the alleged 
deprivation occurring during 1991-92.  We emphasize, however, 
that the 1991-92 IEP would have to have been contested at the 
proper time before a court even considers whether the district's 
failure to remedy the allegedly inappropriate IEP was prolonged. 
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residential placement, but we will reverse the order insofar as 
it upheld the award of compensatory education. 
